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John W. Murphy 
The Colonization of the Future
(Ateities kolonizavimas)
Santrauka. Pagrindinė šio straipsnio idėja yra ta, kad pasaulis, įskaitant ateities dimensiją, patiria 
kolonizaciją kaip tęstinį procesą. Kalbant apibendrintai, tai rodo, jog žmonės išleidžia iš rankų savo patyri-
mo kontrolę. Kalbant Marxo terminais, jie susvetimėja ir praranda pasitikėjimą savimi šiame grėsmingame 
pasaulyje.
Būti postkolonializmo būklėje – tolygu siekti, kad žmonės įgytų gebėjimus, kurie jiems padėtų susigrą-
žinti istoriją. Užuot vergavę istorijai ir socialinėms sąlygoms jie turi išgalių kurti save ir savo pačių aplinką. 
Kad pasipriešinti kolonizacijai, reikia daugiau utopinių idėjų. Priešingai negu teigia daugelis kritikų, utopija 
nėra nei iracionali, nei žadinanti fantazijas. Utopinio mąstymo paskirtis – išvengti pavojaus, kurį kelia įprasti 
socialinės tikrovės vaizdiniai.
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1. Introduction
Central to this paper is the idea that the 
world, including the future, is in the process 
of being colonized. In general, what this me-
ans is that persons do not have control of 
their experiences. In terms supplied by Marx 
(1973), they are alienated and lost in a threat-
ening world. For example, neither the econo-
my nor culture seems to have any relationship 
to their desires. But different from Weber’s 
notion of increasing rationalization, this pro-
blem is not related merely to the appearance 
of more rules and regulations.
Yet is there really anything new about 
a discussion of alienation? Some critics, alt-
hough they are mostly Marxists, claim that 
capitalism is the source of this aliment. In 
this case, workers are trapped in a cycle of 
production where they are treated as a re-
source—“labor power”—that is purchased at 
the lowest possible price. In this regard, these 
persons are transformed into commodities 
and lose their humanity.
Other writers argue that alienation is a 
product of modernity. As Weber described 
(1978), the increasing rationalization of the 
world leads to a situation where anything that 
cannot be readily quantified and objectified is 
diminished in importance. Within this con-
text, personal creativity represents a style of 
uncertainty that must be constrained. And in 
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the end, the life is squeezed out of most ac-
tivities.
According to several writers, located at 
El Departamento Ecuménico de Investiga-
ciones (DEI) in Costa Rica, a confluence of 
these factors is operating nowadays to crea-
te alienation. Particularly important in their 
work is how the market is described. In ty-
pical Marxist fashion, rules and definitions 
are assumed to be imposed on the masses 
through the exercise of power by the privi-
leged classes. Behind a façade of economic 
laws and rationality lurks the desire for social 
enslavement and economic advantage (Sung, 
1989).
But others argue, such as Franz Hin-
kelammert (1991), that this matter is not so 
simple. Without a doubt the market fosters 
alienation. What is debatable, however, is how 
control and the accompanying dehumanizati-
on are exerted. Most of the writers associated 
with DEI contend that the market conceals 
the abuse of power through the creation of 
an elaborate ideology. Through a strange mi-
xture of science, economics, and morality, for 
example, the market becomes a neutral devi-
ce that is perceived to benefit all of humanity.
In some ways, Foucault’s (1978) thesis 
on “micro-power” is operative in this des-
cription of social control. Through the use 
of symbols that are twisted to appear objec-
tive, and thus universal, control is imposed 
in an allegedly benign or apolitical manner. 
But this mode of control has been extended 
far beyond interpersonal discourse. In today’s 
world, the influence of the market has infil-
trated every relationship, even those at the 
institutional level.
In view of this turn of events, Hinke-
lammert (2002) and Serrano (1995) have re-
ferred to the contemporary world as a “Total 
Market.” Their point is that the market, due 
to the alleged neutrality and universality of 
this device, has penetrated every aspect of 
social and cultural life. A culture of the mar-
ket, in other words, has become prevalent 
and defines the value of most events and be-
havior. And as might be expected, anything 
that does not fit neatly into the algorithm of 
supply and demand is diminished in impor-
tance. 
As a result of this maneuver, social con-
trol is made to appear neutral, even rational. 
After all, most persons fail to see the exercise 
of power as influencing their choices of a ca-
reer or education. For example, students se-
lect their courses in the hope of acquiring the 
“cultural capital” necessary for them to beco-
me marketable. Behaving in such a manner 
is simply rational and makes good economic 
sense. In a very appealing way, questions 
about the exploitative side of capitalism are 
concealed systematically behind claims about 
economic cycles and market discipline. 
Part of this control, notes Hinkelam-
mert and his colleagues, is the colonization 
of the future. What is noteworthy about this 
insight is that traditionally the future is lin-
ked to hope and renewal. But if the future 
cannot offer alternatives, and merely recapi-
tulates the past, social change is unlikely and 
traditional institutional arrangements will go 
unchallenged. In effect, persons will continue 
to face a market that dictates current policies 
and practices, in addition to what is feasible 
in the future.
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The problem is that Hinkelammert sim-
ply suggests that the influence of the market 
has been extended to infinity. The scholars 
as DEI have not discussed, in any apprecia-
ble detail, how the philosophical principles 
essential to substantiating the market have 
undermined the future. The goal of this dis-
cussion is to examine these ideas.
2. The Colonization Thesis
Colonization has a long history. And 
in some quarters a postcolonial phase of de-
velopment is assumed to have been reached 
(Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin, 1999). At the 
heart of the colonial debate, however, are the 
issues of agency and social control. In fact, 
Mkandawire (2005) declares that basic to 
colonization is the elimination of any agency 
on the part of the colonized. Central to this 
history, in other words, has been the attempt 
made by various European societies to expro-
priate the riches of their colonies, which have 
been located often in Africa, Asia, or Latin 
America. And as might be expected, this co-
lonial history has been quite violent.
A vital part of the colonization process 
is the gradual inferiorization of the colonial 
society (Fanon. 1963; Memmi, 1991). Ac-
cording to the standard scenario, the colo-
nizer is portrayed as bringing civilization to 
foreign lands. These places, accordingly, are 
presumed to be backward and incapable of 
advancing through their own efforts. Science 
and religion, for example, have been invoked 
regularly to rationalize this inferiority. But as 
a reward for their diligence and benevolence, 
the colonizers are permitted to transfer syste-
matically the wealth of these colonies to the 
so-called home countries.
As is clear from history, this inferiori-
zation process is quite brutal. Theories are 
proposed that undermine the populations 
and cultures of colonial societies. These per-
sons are described to reside, for example, at 
the lower levels of the evolutionary scale, and 
thus lack intelligence, morality, and other im-
portant traits. Additionally, this inferioriza-
tion is reinforced through practices that are 
often cruel and degrading. Simply stated, the 
inhabitants of colonies are identified as sub-
human and are treated accordingly.
So, when Habermas (1975) began his 
discussion of colonization, the use of this 
term conveyed a very negative image. As a 
result of the asymmetrical link that exists 
between the system and the life-world, par-
ticularly in modern societies, Habermas 
maintains that persons are estranged from 
their experiences and conceptions of reality. 
In other words, how they define themselves 
and their social relationships is criticized and 
rendered insignificant. Accordingly, to use 
Habermas’ language, the “life-world” of per-
sons is colonized.
Clearly Habermas is describing alienati-
on, although with new terminology. The term 
life-world, or lebenswelt, is not a traditional 
part of the Marxist lexicon, but was popu-
larized by Edmund Husserl (1970) and his 
followers. Habermas is borrowing from phe-
nomenology, and by doing so is illustrating 
the political side of a school of thought that is 
treated typically as devoid of politics.
What is Habermas saying when he decla-
res that the life-world is on the verge of co-
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lonization? In the work of Husserl and other 
phenomenologists, the life-world refers to the 
realm inhabited by persons that is constitu-
ted by their values, beliefs, and experiences. 
Because consciousness is always conscious of 
something, writes Husserl (1964), knowledge 
and order are not autonomous; indeed, cons-
cious is active and penetrates everything that 
is known. Social reality, therefore, should not 
be confronted as an objective force, because 
everyday existence is constituted through in-
dividual and collective action. The life-world, 
in short, embodies the decisions made by per-
sons that differentiate reality from illusion.
Clearly when Habermas says that the 
world is being colonized he is acknowled-
ging a violent process. Without a doubt, the 
world is being intentionally cleansed of the 
existential texture that persons have inven-
ted. But he is also suggesting, contrary to the 
standard rendition of colonialism, that this 
process does not necessarily take the form of 
overt attacks. As is illustrated by history, the 
life-world can be appropriated through a vio-
lent means, such as when the cultural herita-
ge of a society is confiscated and destroyed. 
Nonetheless, the colonization that Habermas 
has in mind is equally damaging, but is much 
more subtle. How citizens constitute the soci-
al world is being overshadowed by structures 
and systems—so-called external forces—that 
redefine persons and their relationships.
In point of fact, Bourdieu (1992) refers to 
the colonization of the life-world as “symbolic 
violence.” The assumption is that this mode of 
domination is quite destructive, but is imple-
mented through a sophisticated means that is 
not necessarily confrontational. Through the 
juxtaposition of symbols, and the accompa-
nying portrayal of reality, persons are led to 
believe that they do not have a significant role 
in the construction of individual and social 
meanings and their institutionalization. The 
life-world is thus reified and transformed into 
a realm comprised of autonomous objects and 
events. The experiences of persons, accordin-
gly, become their adversary.
Bourdieu, additionally, calls this style of 
reification misperception. His point is that 
persons are alienated, but only in the last re-
sort through the usual crude political conf-
rontations and manipulation. Through sym-
bolic violence, persons actually participate, 
and thus are complicit, in their alienation. 
In other words, they become convinced that 
their involvement in the construction of rea-
lity is unnecessary, ineffective, and, possibly, 
irrational. Therefore, they relinquish, often 
willingly, control of their life-worlds, and thus 
their existential projects.
3. Colonization and the Future
The market is sustained by a particular 
mode of legitimacy that supports coloni-
zation of all sorts, even of the future. Some 
proponents of the current phase of globaliza-
tion, for example, claim that the market is a 
product of both long and short-term cycles of 
economic evolution. Others simply propose 
that markets reflect deep-seated human ten-
dencies, or bring to fruition the rationality 
witnessed in natural and social laws. In any 
case, markets are the product of fundamental 
principles that pervade humanity and justify 
this mechanism of exchange.
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Similar to other products of the “first 
philosophy” practiced in the West, the mar-
ket has almost unquestioned legitimacy. In 
this regard, Harvey Cox (1999) writes that the 
market has been accorded, in some circles, 
the status usually accorded to a god. Whereas 
Plato introduced his Ideas to sustain know-
ledge and morality, the market is reinforced 
by a similar abstraction. That is, history or 
basic rationality is presumed to justify the 
operation of this device.
Nonetheless, how does this ontology af-
fect the future? The essential message at this 
juncture is that the future is not within hu-
man control. In an almost deterministic man-
ner, the future, similar to the market, is an 
outgrowth of primordial tendencies that are 
unaffected by volition. A functional economy 
without markets, for example, is announced 
to be impossible and utopian. Likewise, any 
talk about creating the future makes little 
sense and should not be pursued. Only tho-
se who are irresponsible or unruly would not 
heed this advice. That persons can invent the 
future is merely an illusion based on outmo-
ded mythology.
Reasonable and productive persons, 
in the modern world, have abandoned the-
se illusions. As a group, they are now much 
more rational. What this idea means in this 
context is that mature and intelligent per-
sons adjust to historical demands. They do 
not attack windmills, so to speak, but learn 
how to adapt effectively to economic and ot-
her institutional imperatives. Whatever the 
future delivers will provide challenges that 
skilled and resourceful persons can overco-
me. But in the end, the ability to adapt is the 
measure of a person or group’s intelligence 
or creativity.
In daily affairs, this assimilation is ma-
nifested in politics that becomes very pra-
gmatic. In this sense, rapid changes are es-
chewed, while politicians or policy makers 
strive to tinker with the prevailing social 
system. Consequently, any proposals that 
envision an alternative economic or political 
system are labeled idealistic or futuristic and 
dismissed.
As a result of this confluence of ideas, 
the future is colonized. First, the future has 
a source that nobody can control. Specifi-
cally, history evolves and produces changes 
that persons must confront. Reminiscent 
of Hegel, history has a destiny that human 
action does not influence to any serious 
degree. The future, therefore, is best appro-
ached through hope or prayer. Any other 
type of intervention is futile and indicative 
of megalomania. 
And second, given the intimate relati-
onship between history and the future, per-
sons are left with few options. Those who are 
rational or prudent do not challenge fate or 
destiny. The question that is often raised is: 
How can they possibly know what is best for 
humanity? This is Hayek’s response to social 
planners. Such a realization, additionally, may 
improve the overall mental health of a society. 
Specifically, persons will not be so foolish to 
believe that everyday or average persons can 
change the course of history. Only exception 
individuals or national heroes, for example, 
are capable of such feats. Hence the masses 
are excluded as a viable agent of history and 
pacified.
 63
Sociologija. Mintis ir veiksmas 2008/2 (22), ISSN 1392-3358 Politikos sociologija
4. A world without hope
When history is treated as autonomous, 
the future is destroyed in a manner reminis-
cent of early colonization. How persons might 
imagine the future, for example, is assumed 
to be nothing but a fantasy. This dream, mo-
reover, can never be realized! And those who 
express these visions are likely labeled as un-
sound, wacky idealists and socially margina-
lized. At other times they may be considered 
dangerous revolutionaries. As a result, per-
sons become dominated by the future; the 
future arrives and they have no alternative 
recourse.
In this way, persons are actually domi-
nated by the future. As the future emerges, 
and is likely welcomed by the powerful social 
classes, any serious opposition is discoura-
ged. Through the juxtaposition of history and 
the contingent masses, criticism is revealed 
to be uninformed and frivolous, but dange-
rous. The future thus appears unscathed and 
fully rationalized, and any critique is succes-
sfully sequestered. In the mid-1960s, Herbert 
Marcuse (1964) referred to the resulting con-
dition as a “one-dimensional” world. How 
could a fully rationalized product of history 
be anything other than reasonable, to parap-
hrase Hegel?
All the time, however, this scenario is 
based on a faulty premise. Particularly no-
teworthy, and because of the general accep-
tance of dualism, history is treated as auto-
nomous, and thus is capable of delivering a 
future that reflects the desires of humanity. 
In other words, there is nothing biased about 
history. The possibility that the will of a parti-
cular class of persons, for example, might be 
hiding behind claims about universality and 
necessity is not given any serious considera-
tion. Because history is universal—the uni-
versal and the particular are part of a single, 
abstract historical movement—a perfectly 
legitimate future is presumed to be accessible 
to everyone.
In a way, this form of domination is si-
milar to what Derrida (1978) has in mind 
with his notion of “archē-violence.” Such cru-
elty originates from a foundational principle 
and thus is profound. The key shortcoming 
of Derrida’s portrayal of this power is that 
he focuses primarily on interpersonal relati-
onships. Hence any resulting domination is a 
personal issue, contingent, and available for 
critique.
The colonization of the future, however, 
originates from a thoroughly abstract prin-
ciple, or history, and is not contingent. And 
anyone who applies the rules or classificato-
ry schemes that originate from history is not 
exhibiting bias, but is simply following his-
torical or institutional demands. Accordin-
gly, those who justify their actions through 
recourse to these abstractions are often not 
held accountable for their actions, since they 
claim regularly they were merely adhering to 
the law or governmental decrees. 
Eventually, however, persons may be-
gin to recognize that they are facing an un-
relenting march of history; history, in fact, 
is a juggernaut. And as a consequence of 
this realization, the future becomes devoid 
of hope. At this juncture, hope is understo-
od in the manner intended by Ernst Bloch 
(1986). Most important about his description 
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is that persons feel enthusiastic about the fu-
ture when they can witness directly how their 
dreams and ambitions might be fulfilled. This 
insight is possible, however, only when the 
future is imagined to be contingent, and a 
crack is recognized to exist in the facade of 
determinism. 
True hope, according to Bloch, is not 
merely psychological but ontological. The 
inability to close history completely, in ot-
her words, is central to the preservation of 
hope. The success of colonization, on the ot-
her hand, depends on the inability of persons 
to view themselves and their prospects in a 
manner different from the past. In sum, co-
lonization requires that the past, or history, 
continue uninterrupted.
5. An Open Future
Some critics contend that civilization 
has now entered the postcolonial period. 
What this designation means is that coloni-
zation has ended—although various writers 
dispute this claim—and former colonies are 
now free to define themselves and their his-
tory (Loomba, 2005). But certainly important 
is that post-coloniality is not simply another 
stage of history. The rational for this conclu-
sion is quite simple: that is, if this were the 
case, persons would merely be delivered to 
another development phase without any cri-
tical reflection.
Karl Marx faced a similar dilemma when 
he assessed the impact of Hegel’s rendition of 
history on the prospects of a revolution ori-
ginating from the proletariat. In this regard, 
Marx wanted the working class to become the 
new agents of history, foment a revolution, 
and remake the world. What he believed, in 
short, is that these exploited persons should 
be able to redefine themselves in their own 
image. This outcome is only possible, accor-
ding to Marx, through the critical reflection 
that Hegel’s philosophy of history denies. He-
gel, after all, understood events and identities 
to the outcome of an abstract, evolutionary 
process.
Persons can become revolutionary in the 
sense intended by Marx only when history is 
recognized to embody human praxis. In this 
sense, history does not produce events, but 
represents the struggle of persons to meet 
their needs and fulfill their desires. Stated dif-
ferently, history does not guarantee or deliver 
anything; contrary to Hegel’s thesis, history 
does not possess an ethereal telos.
Again to cite Marx, he wants persons to 
appreciate that they make history, although 
not always under conditions of their own 
choosing. Although events may appear to 
be predetermined, due to the effects of ide-
ology or so-called structural imperatives, the 
working classes are the agents rather than the 
products of change. What Marx is saying in 
more contemporary parlance is that the dua-
lism that has justified the autonomy of histo-
ry, and the colonization of many societies, is 
sustained by an illusion that is now defunct. 
The source of history is not abstract ideas, in 
the Hegelian sense, but the everyday struggles 
and conflicts that are a part of persons trying 
to create an identity and a future for themsel-
ves. In this regard, Marx viewed himself to be 
a materialist.
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To be post-colonial, accordingly, means 
that persons have gained the insight necessa-
ry to retrieve history. Rather than enslaved by 
history, and thus determined a priori by soci-
al conditions, they are able to create themsel-
ves and new institutional arrangements. They 
are not restricted by history, and thus unable 
to invent the future, but can begin to rethink 
radically about the nature of collective identi-
ty and social integration. Only in this manner 
can the remnants of colonization be abando-
ned.
6. Conclusion
In order to counteract colonization, 
what is needed is more utopian thought. 
Contrary to what many critics may believe, 
utopianism is neither irrational nor indi-
cative of fantasy. Central to utopian thin-
king, instead, is a refusal to be entrapped 
in the traditional portrayal of social reality 
(Casaldáliga, 1987).
Rather than delivered by history, uto-
pians argue that the past, and thus the future, 
represents merely a specific construction of 
reality. What is considered to be traditional, 
therefore, is simply one possibility among ot-
hers. Nonetheless, through ideology and the 
exercise of power, and sometimes consensus, 
this version of reality has come to be accepted 
as natural and, possibly, rational.
Hence a break with a traditional perspec-
tive does not signal automatically the onset of 
disaster. All that is occurring, according to 
utopians, is a shift in orientation, with no bro-
ader implications. For this reason, utopians 
are not afraid to seize history and propose 
an alternative vision of the future. Although 
a proposal may be completely different from 
the past, or never realized successfully before, 
utopians are not deterred. New perspectives 
have to be dealt with on their own merits, rat-
her than in terms of criteria that were accep-
table or normal in the past, but perhaps irre-
levant to the future. Stated simply, the future 
is something new.
In this regard, utopians are not neces-
sarily pragmatic and limited to proposing 
piecemeal changes. In many ways, because 
of their disregard for history, they are adven-
turous and scary. They want to make history, 
instead of adhering to the prevailing norms. 
Obviously such a radical stance is needed to 
end colonialism! History must be rethought, 
possibly in ways never before imagined, if 
more inclusive or fair institutions are going to 
be created.
Those who benefit from the prevailing 
institutional arrangements may complain 
that any deviation from tradition is going to 
destroy society. Such changes are simply ir-
rational and irresponsible, they may declare. 
But utopians argue that there is no ontolo-
gical basis for these claims. Their position is 
that the past represents certain interests, and 
thus the future can embody other, possibly 
different perspectives. So, if these novel chan-
ges are desired, by the masses, for example, 
these options are not automatically precluded 
from history.
In order to avoid the colonization of 
the future, this insight of the utopians is very 
important. Specifically, history is always the 
product of some interests, and therefore the 
appearance of new visions does not violate 
this principle. The utopians contend, accor-
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dingly, that the future belongs to those who 
are daring enough to reinvent their destiny. 
In today’s world where abstract imperatives—
mostly inspired by the economy—dominate 
the social and political scene, this advice 
might prove to be quite liberating.
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AbSTRACT 
Central to this paper is the idea that the world, including the future, is in the process of being colonized. 
In general, what this means is that persons do not have control of their experiences. In terms supplied by 
Marx, they are alienated and lost in a threatening world. 
To be post-colonial means that persons have gained the insight necessary to retrieve history. Rather 
than enslaved by history, and thus determined a priori by social conditions, they are able to create them-
selves and new institutional arrangements. They are not restricted by history, and thus unable to invent 
the future, but can begin to rethink radically about the nature of collective identity and social integration. 
Only in this manner can the remnants of colonization be abandoned.
In order to counteract colonization, what is needed is more utopian thought. Contrary to what many 
critics may believe, utopianism is neither irrational nor indicative of fantasy. Central to utopian thinking, 
instead, is a refusal to be entrapped in the traditional portrayal of social reality.
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